



WHEN “YES” MEANS NO: THE SUBJUGATION OF 
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER CHOICE BY EXCLUSIVE 
MUNICIPAL CABLE FRANCHISES 
Jonathan E. Samon∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Cable television subscribers are plagued by regulations that 
prohibit consumer choice in selecting an individual cable television 
provider.  The effects of these regulations are widespread because 
cable television has become a common fixture in many American 
households.1  The regulations have been embedded in the industry 
since the introduction of cable television in 19482 and have taken 
many forms.3  Initially, the government imposed regulations primarily 
due to the competitive effects that cable television had on local 
television stations.4  As the technology developed and became more 
commonplace, the regulations evolved in a manner all their own.5 
Classification of the cable television industry as a natural 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate 2004, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S. Economics, 
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 1 A study sponsored by the Cable & Telecommunications Association for 
Marketing showed nearly two out of every three U.S. households had access to cable 
television.  National Cable & Telecommunications Association, The History of Cable 
Television, at http://www.ncta.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2003). 
 2 Id.  “Cable television originated in the United States almost simultaneously in 
Arkansas, Oregon and Pennsylvania in 1948 to enhance poor reception of over-the-
air television signals in mountainous or geographically remote areas.” Id. 
 3 See infra Part II (discussing The Communications Act of 1934 [hereinafter 
Communications Act], the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 [hereinafter 
1984 Act], the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 
[hereinafter 1992 Act], and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 [hereinafter 1996 
Act]). 
 4 See National Cable & Telecommunications Association, supra note 1.  The FCC 
responded to concerns from the broadcast industry by “expand[ing] its jurisdiction 
and plac[ing] restrictions on the ability of cable systems to import distant television 
signals.”  Id. 
 5 The FCC restrictions led to “a ‘freeze’ effect on the development of cable 
systems in major markets, lasting into the early [19]70s.”  Id.  See infra Part II 
(discussing the interplay between federal and local regulations). 
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monopoly stifles consumer choice.6  Natural monopoly status creates 
an incentive for municipalities to award exclusive franchises to cable 
television providers.  This status allegedly results in greater 
efficiencies for the industry7 and increased revenue for the 
municipality.8  Despite the supposed benefits of a natural monopoly, 
the lack of competition, in addition to hindering consumer choice, 
frequently leads to poor service.9 
Competition is the current driving force behind technological 
change in the cable television industry.10  The goal of competition is 
to make cable television the source for distributing digital sound, 
video, voice, and data communications to homes and offices.11  
Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”)12 
deregulated a wide array of sectors within the telecommunications 
industry,13 the task of deregulating the cable industry remains 
incomplete.14 
 
 6 See infra Part I (examining the economic principles behind natural 
monopolies). 
 7 See STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY & APPLICATIONS 356 (4th ed. 1999) 
(explaining that under conditions of natural monopoly, the firm’s average cost curve 
is decreasing at the point it crosses market demand, so the firm could only survive if 
it is monopolized). 
 8 Daniel E. Brenner, Was Cable Television a Monopoly?, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 365, 
399 (1990).  “Among the benefits [provided to the community by the monopoly 
cable provider] was the cable franchise fee extracted from operators.  The cable 
franchise fee is a charge made by a local or state government to pay for the cost of 
regulation.”  Id. 
 9 Luis Puga, Lawmakers Hear Cable Complaints, Question BPU, PRESS OF ATLANTIC 
CITY, Nov. 22, 2002, available at http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com.  Members of the 
New Jersey General Assembly Telecommunications and Utilities Committee 
questioned the practices of the state Board of Public Utilities oversight of the cable 
television industry after the Board received 19,633 complaints from customers 
during 2002, up from 13,617 in 2001.  Id.  “The complaints included rising bills in 
the expanded-basic service, poor reception, poor service, inaccurate billing and 
channels that subscribers don’t want to pay for.”  Id. 
 10 Cable TV: Advanced Technologies, Jones Telecommunications & Multimedia 
Encyclopedia, at http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/catvtech.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2002). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) 
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).  See infra Part II (discussing the 1996 
Act’s impact on the cable industry). 
 13 Id.  The 1996 Act eliminated regulatory barriers and encouraged competition 
in nearly every sector of the communications landscape.  Richard E. Wiley, The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practice 
groupnewsletters/telecommunications (last visited Aug. 28, 2002). 
 14 See infra Part II (discussing the implications of “effective competition”); 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Jones Telecommunications & Multimedia 
Encyclopedia [hereinafter Jones], at http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/ 
update/telcom1.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2002) (referencing the 1996 Act’s 
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The recently settled15 action between the Yankees Entertainment 
& Sports Network, LLC16 (“YES”) and Cablevision Systems 
Corporation (“Cablevision”) provides a current example of the 
problems associated with exclusive franchises.  Until the settlement, 
Cablevision refused to carry YES.17  Cablevision customers were 
unable to switch to another cable provider in an attempt to receive 
YES because of the insurmountable impediment that exclusive 
franchises had created.  The dispute between YES and Cablevision 
highlights the juxtaposition of a government-sanctioned monopoly in 
a free market economy.  Consumer choice is sacrificed under 
monopoly conditions in favor of protecting a firm that presumably 
cannot survive under competitive pricing.18 
This Comment analyzes the classification of the cable television 
industry as a natural monopoly, evaluates the consequences such a 
classification has on the regulatory scheme imposed on the industry, 
and reveals the viability of introducing competition into the industry.  
Part I provides a background of the economic concepts discussed 
throughout this Comment, such as natural monopolies and 
monopoly pricing.  This section also discusses current events that 
have brought renewed relevance to this topic, in particular, the 
dispute between YES and Cablevision.  Part II contemplates whether 
natural monopolies create the need for regulations or whether the 
regulations create natural monopolies.  The checkered regulatory 
history of cable television demonstrates how uncertainty regarding 
cable television’s role in society influenced initial congressional 
decision making.  Similar trepidation hampered state and local 
governments when they gained jurisdiction over cable television and 
continue to plague the industry today. 
Part III examines the rationale for the characterization of the 
 
consideration of satellite television as not being effective competition for cable 
systems, thus precluding those systems that compete with satellite providers from 
deregulation). 
 15 Richard Sandomir, Cablevision Agrees to Carry the YES Network, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
13, 2003, at D1 [hereinafter Sandomir I].  The YES Network and Cablevision reached 
an agreement on March 12, 2003 “with a one-year deal that will make the network’s 
Yankees and Nets games available to Cablevision’s nearly three million subscribers in 
the Bronx, Brooklyn, Westchester, New Jersey and Connecticut, starting March 31.”  
Id.  That agreement subsequently broke down, but New York State Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer brokered the final one-year agreement in time for the start of the 
Yankees’ season on March 31.  Richard Sandomir, Cablevision and YES Reach 
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at S2 [hereinafter Sandomir II]. 
 16 Complaint, Yankees Entm’t & Sports Network, LLC v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. 
and CSC Holdings, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-CV-3242) [hereinafter Yankees]. 
 17 Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D4. 
 18 See LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 356-57. 
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cable television industry as a natural monopoly in the first place.  The 
novelty of the technology was a significant factor at the time of the 
introduction of cable television because of the lack of suppliers and 
expertise.  With those hurdles long since surpassed, the logic 
supporting cable television’s classification no longer prevails.  As a 
result, the classification must be modified. 
Part IV presents examples of how the classification of industries 
as natural monopolies often suppresses consumer choice regarding 
rates and service.  Although this Comment specifically targets the 
cable television industry, the effects are common throughout many 
industries providing typical household utilities.19  Given the negative 
effects of natural monopolies, protecting a particular supplier cannot 
be the ideal solution when alternatives, such as a competitive market, 
exist for the video marketplace. 
This Comment concludes that an obvious alternative arising 
from the core tenets of the American free-market system20 is to 
remove the regulatory framework that grants exclusive franchises in 
the cable television industry and to permit true competition 
throughout the video marketplace.  Economists have long lauded 
competition as the most effective means of preserving consumer 
choice.21  Although the introduction of direct broadcast satellite 
(“DBS”) television has added an element of competition to the video 
marketplace, the administrative component of purchasing DBS 
service is not yet at a level comparable to free market choice22 to 
consider it a viable alternative.  Even though it is not a perfect 
substitute, DBS has opened the door to the possibility of true 
competition, such as having two or more cable television providers in 
a single municipality, finally breaking the local cable monopoly.  The 
emergence of a viable competitor to cable television supports the 
 
 19 Alexandra I. Metzner, Were California’s Electricity Price Shocks Nothing More Than a 
New Form of Stranded Costs?, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 536 (2002).  California’s electricity 
system suffered because it “was weak and was not properly servicing demand or 
maintaining sufficient electricity reserves; this was attributable to both wholesalers’ 
lack of motivation to cut costs . . . and to the industry’s function as a natural 
monopoly.”  Id. at 536 n.7. 
 20 MARK S. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY—LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 
16-17 (1962). 
 21 See, e.g., JOHN MAURICE CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 9-18 (1961); 
ANDREAS G. PAPANDREOU & JOHN T. WHEELER, COMPETITION AND ITS REGULATION 3-8 
(1954). 
 22 A 2002 industry estimate showed cable subscribership at approximately sixty-
five million households and DBS subscribership at twenty million households.  
Ronald Grover & Tom Lowry, As Satellite Dishes It Out, Cable TV Fights Back, BUS. WK., 
Jan. 13, 2002, at 40. 
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idea of removing the last remnant of regulation in the video 
marketplace by eliminating exclusive municipal cable franchises. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Relevant Legal and Factual Background 
On April 29, 2002, YES filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York23 against 
Cablevision in an attempt to compel Cablevision to carry all New York 
Yankees games that YES broadcasts.24  Cablevision is the largest cable 
provider in the greater New York metropolitan area25 (“region”), with 
customers in nearly one million subscriber households in New Jersey26 
and over three million subscriber households in the region overall.27  
The complaint alleged that Cablevision abused its monopoly power 
over the cable television market in the region,28 protecting its own 
regional sports networks at the expense of the fledgling YES 
network.29 
Cablevision is the majority owner and manager of the Madison 
Square Garden Network (“MSG”) and Fox Sports New York 
(“FSNY”).30  The YES complaint alleged that prior to the creation of 
YES in 2001, MSG and FSNY were the only networks in the region 
“primarily devoted to providing live broadcasts of local professional 
teams and other sports programming of particular interest to greater 
New York metropolitan area sports fans.”31  Cablevision carried MSG 
and FSNY on its own systems and sold the channels to other cable 
systems in the region.32  With the creation of YES, and the resulting 
competition in the local sports market, Cablevision refused to carry 
YES although it had always sold its own channels to other cable 
systems.33  The agreements between YES and other cable providers 
included paying YES a monthly fee of $2 per subscriber to carry the 
 
 23 Yankees, at 1. 
 24 Matthew Futterman, Network Sues Over Yankees’ Blackout, THE STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, NJ), Apr. 30, 2002, at 13. 
 25 Matthew Futterman, Nothing New on YES Front, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), 
Mar. 30, 2002, at 30. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Yankees, at 3. 
 28 Futterman, supra note 24, at 13. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D4. 
 31 Yankees, at 3. 
 32 Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D4. 
 33 Id. 
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network on the expanded-basic level.34  YES offered to discount that 
rate to reach an earlier settlement with Cablevision.35  Prior to the 
final settlement, however, Cablevision refused to move from its 
position and settle the dispute.36 
YES filed the complaint one month after reaching an agreement 
with AT&T Broadband, which entailed offering YES on basic 
programming to its 250,000 Connecticut subscribers.37  At the time of 
that agreement, YES had arrangements with twenty-four cable 
providers in addition to the DBS company DirecTV.38  This made YES 
available on basic programming of every major cable system in the 
region, except Cablevision,39 bringing distribution of YES to 
approximately 5.3 million subscribers.40  YES filed the lawsuit after 
eight months of delay in negotiations,41 resulting in Cablevision’s 2.9 
million subscribers in the region42 losing the ability to view 130 of the 
162 Yankees games during the 2002 season.43  Hopes for an end to 
the dispute during the 2002 baseball season diminished after 
Cablevision requested 660 days for trial preparation44 and sent a 
representative to only one of the seven public forums held by a New 
York City Council panel.45  Prior to the settlement with YES, a district 
court judge granted Cablevision its motion to dismiss an anti-
competition claim brought by consumers in the New York area.46  
Conversely, the YES suit against Cablevision survived a motion to 
dismiss.47  One week before the settlement, the New Jersey General 
 
 34 Futterman, supra note 24, at 18.  As a result of the settlement, Cablevision was 
expected to pay a similar monthly fee per subscriber.  Sandomir I, supra note 15, at 
D4. 
 35 Richard Sandomir, Wait Till Next Year, YES Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at 
D5.  YES Chairman Leo J. Hindery Jr. “offered to discount the first year from a 
monthly subscriber fee of $2 to $1.28 and the second year from $2.12 to $1.75.”  Id. 
 36 Cablevision Seeks a Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at D2 [hereinafter 
Cablevision].  Cablevision had offered to pay a subscriber rate of only fifty-five cents.  
Id. 
 37 Futterman, supra note 25, at 30. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Yankees, at 2. 
 41 Futterman, supra note 24, at 13. 
 42 Futterman, supra note 25, at 30. 
 43 Id.  The remaining thirty-two games that season were available to most viewers 
on broadcast or basic cable channels WCBS, ESPN, or Fox.  Steve Zipay & Harry 
Berkowitz, 180 Days Later, Standoff Continues, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 2002, at C19.  
Postseason games aired on Fox or ABC Family.  Id. 
 44 Cablevision, supra note 36, at D2. 
 45 Zipay & Berkowitz, supra note 43, at C19. 
 46 Moccio v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 47 Yankees Entm’t and Sports Network, LLC v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 224 F. 
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Assembly passed a bill designed to compel Cablevision to broadcast 
YES on its system.48 
The effects of the impasse damaged the bottom line of both 
parties.  Cablevision reported 5,400 subscriber defections to DirecTV 
through April 30, 2002,49 and 17,000 defections through June 30.50  
Projections of subscriber losses for the full-year ranged from 27,500 
to 45,000.51  YES estimated the net effect on Cablevision to be a loss of 
$360 million in value.52  YES felt the impact of the dispute in a 
different respect.  Due to the deflated number of subscribers, 
Yankees telecasts on YES averaged a 2.0 cable rating in the region, 
down thirty-three percent from Yankees telecasts on MSG during the 
2001 season.53  Diminished ratings hurt YES through the resultant 
decrease in advertising revenue.54  Furthermore, the standoff had 
consequences extending beyond the baseball season, as YES obtained 
the broadcast rights to New Jersey Nets basketball games for ten years 
beginning with the 2002-03 season.55  The Nets had previously been in 
a long-standing agreement with FSNY.56 
B. The Economic Rationale of Natural Monopolies 
The YES complaint referred to Cablevision’s monopoly power 
over its “captive cable television customers.”57 Cablevision possesses 
this monopoly power due to the exclusive franchises that local 
franchising authorities awarded to cable operators.58  The 
 
Supp. 2d 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The motion was denied, except in regard to the claim 
under New York’s Donnelly Act.  Id. at 679. 
 48 Tom Hester, YES Network Wins Support in Assembly, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
NJ), Mar. 4, 2003, at 13.  A sponsor of the bill claimed that its main objective was to 
encourage a resumption of negotiations between Cablevision and the YES Network 
after sixteen months of bickering.  Id. 
 49 Sandomir, supra note 35, at D5. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id.  Cablevision estimated the number of subscriber losses to be from 30,000 to 
45,000.  Id.  A cable industry official estimated it at 27,500.  Id. 
 52 Id. “Hindery said Cablevision’s subscribers were worth an estimated $4,000 
each, a figure based on what similar cable systems have sold for; if 90,000 have 
defected, . . . the company has lost $360 million in value.”  Id. 
 53 Zipay & Berkowitz, supra note 43, at C19.  Each rating point represents 73,000 
homes.  Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Richard Sandomir, Nets Leave Cablevision and Join YES, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, 
at D4. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Yankees, at 1. 
 58 See 47 U.S.C. § 541 (1996) (prohibiting exclusive franchises).  But see infra Part 
III (explaining de facto exclusive franchises). 
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classification of the cable television industry as a natural monopoly 
produces exclusive cable franchises.  A natural monopoly is “an 
industry in which each firm’s average cost curve is decreasing at the 
point where it crosses market demand.”59  This phenomenon occurs 
when there are relatively large fixed costs60 associated with developing 
a product, but low marginal costs61 associated with distributing the 
product.62  Consequently, most household utilities, such as electricity 
and cable television, are considered natural monopolies.63  Under 
these conditions, if the utility were to price competitively, it would 
develop an operating loss and not survive.64  Therefore, pursuant to 
the goal of promoting economic efficiency, such industries are 
classified as natural monopolies and typically afforded government 
regulatory protection against competition.65  Specifically, in the cable 
television industry, once the company has its cables in place to 
transport the signal to its customer base (the cable company’s fixed 
cost), the cost incurred by the company in delivering its service to 
each individual customer is extremely low.66 
The telephone industry was once heavily regulated,67 based upon 
 
 59 LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 356.  See also 2 HAROLD DEMSETZ, EFFICIENCY, 
COMPETITION, AND POLICY, THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 76 (1989) 
(defining natural monopoly as a situation where “because of production scale 
economies, it is less costly for one firm to produce a commodity in a given market 
than it is for two or more firms, then one firm will survive; if left unregulated, that 
firm will set price and output at monopoly levels”). 
 60 Fixed costs are items that remain the same “regardless of the level of output,” 
often called “overhead.”  LEONARD W. WEISS, ECONOMICS AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY 41 
(1961). 
 61 “[M]arginal cost is the change in cost which will accompany a small change in 
output.”  Id. at 52-53. 
 62 LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 356.  An example is a software manufacturer 
distributing their product over the internet with marginal cost at essentially zero.  Id.  
In a competitive market, the software would sell at marginal cost and nearly be free; 
the market would not survive that pricing scheme.  Id.  A monopolist can instead sell 
for substantially more than marginal cost, earn enough to cover the fixed costs, and 
can remain in business.  Id. 
 63 E.g., Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 401 
n.8 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining the natural monopoly phenomenon in relation to 
cable television, electric utilities, and water works). 
 64 See LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 356-57. 
 65 Id. at 418. 
 66 Kenneth Katkin, Cable Open Access and Direct Access to INTELSTAT, 53 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 77, 84 (2002); see also Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 
694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (detailing the costs incurred by cable television 
companies). 
 67 See United States v. Western Electric Co., 1982-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 64,900 
(Aug. 24, 1982) (requiring AT&T “to divest all 22 Bell operating companies 
providing local exchange telephone service”). 
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a natural monopoly rationale similar to that of cable television, until 
Congress dramatically altered that regulatory landscape with the 1996 
Act.68  The 1996 Act overhauled and deregulated most of the 
communications industry.69  For example, the 1996 Act removed 
restrictions imposed upon the telephone industry by the 1982 AT&T 
Consent Decree.70  It also permitted the “Baby Bells”71 to enter the 
long-distance telephone market,72 while simultaneously permitting 
long distance carriers to enter the local market.73  This deregulation 
resulted in competition in both the long distance and local telephone 
markets unseen since the AT&T break-up.74 
In the newly deregulated telephone industry, customers electing 
to change their local provider can do so simply by calling their new 
provider of choice.75  Although the service provider is switched with 
ease from the consumer’s perspective, the switch requires more work 
on the part of the telephone companies.76  Even so, the telephone 
companies have enough incentive to complete the switch.77  Switching 
cable television providers can be accomplished through the same 
means as switching telephone service providers; yet, customers do not 
have the option to switch cable providers due to the barriers imposed 
by exclusive franchises.  Although the economics of the services that 
telephone and cable television companies provide are unmistakably 
similar,78 the 1996 Act did not effectively introduce competition into 
 
 68 Supra note 12. 
 69 See infra Part II (analyzing the regulatory landscape). 
 70 Western Electric Co., 1982-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 64,900. 
 71 This term is commonly used to refer to the twenty-two Bell operating 
companies providing local telephone service that were divested from AT&T in the 
1982 consent decree.  See supra note 67. 
 72 See Wiley, supra note 13. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 In many cases, the new carrier may in fact call the consumers. See Deregulated, 
CONSUMER REP., July 2002, at 30 [hereinafter Deregulated] (lamenting the negative 
effects of deregulation “where incessant telemarketers interrupt your dinner but 
customer service won’t answer the phone”). 
 76 Miles W. Hughes, Telecommunications Reform and the Death of the Local Exchange 
Monopoly, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 179, 211-12 (1996).  After obtaining state authority to 
provide local telephone service, the new providers must negotiate with the 
incumbent for “interconnection and collocation with the existing local exchange 
network.”  Id. at 211.  The new providers’ expensive alternative to negotiation is to 
construct a local infrastructure of its own to provide service.  Id. at 211 n.282. 
 77 Id. at 212.  Incumbent cable providers have incentives to complete negotiations 
because “the [1996] Act does not permit them to enter the long-distance market 
until effective competition exists within their local exchange territory.”  Id.; see also 47 
U.S.C. § 271 (1996). 
 78 Katkin, supra note 66, at 84. 
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the cable television industry through deregulation.79 
II. A REVIEW OF THE VARYING LOGIC BEHIND THE REGULATIONS THAT 
SOLIDIFIED CABLE TELEVISION’S MONOPOLY STATUS 
The checkered regulatory history of cable television illustrates 
the difficulty Congress has had in shaping a policy that best suits the 
technology.  Congress’s oft-changing regulation of cable television 
began in the early 1930s when radio entered mainstream America.80  
When public concern grew over its effects,81 Congress responded by 
enacting the Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”).82  
The Communications Act regulated all wire and radio 
communications available at that time, namely transmissions by radio, 
telephone, and telegraph.83  The Communications Act created the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) as the body in charge 
of promulgating regulations over the aforementioned media.84  
Furthermore, the Communications Act gave the FCC jurisdiction 
over common carriers.85  Nonetheless, the FCC initially declined to 
regulate cable television on the grounds that it did not fall within the 
statutory definition of common carrier.86  This abdication by the 
federal government left cable television regulation to state and local 
governments, which they engaged in by franchising cable systems to 
use public ways for their distribution systems.87 
The FCC reversed course in 1959 when cable television 
operators began including non-local signals on their cable systems.88  
 
 79 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 14. 
 80 Kent D. Wakeford, Municipal Cable Franchising: An Unwarranted Intrusion into 
Competitive Markets, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 233, 239 (1995); see also 2 ERIK BARNOUW, THE 
GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 22-26 (1968). 
 81 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 239. 
 82 Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-614). 
 83 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 239 n.26. 
 84 Id. at 240. 
 85 See 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1934) (defining common carriers as “any person engaged 
as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or 
radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, . . . but a person 
engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be 
deemed a common carrier”). 
 86 Frontier Broad. Co. v. Laramie Cmty. T.V. Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958) 
(dismissing complaint asserting that cable television systems are common carriers 
within the meaning of the Communications Act under the rationale that the signals 
received and distributed by the cable systems are determined by the system and not 
the subscriber). 
 87 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 241. 
 88 Thomas W. Hazlett, Station Brakes: The Government’s Campaign Against Cable 
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While cable television had not previously affected local broadcasters, 
the FCC stepped in at that point to protect them from competition.89  
The FCC later refined its position in 1972,90 stating that cable 
operators are neither broadcasters nor common carriers, but instead 
“cable is a hybrid that requires identification and regulation as a 
separate force in communications.”91 
The FCC, noting the deleterious effect of over-regulating a 
growing industry, almost immediately engaged in deregulation of 
cable television.92  The FCC’s new approach examined jurisdictional 
and technological limitations and eliminated duplicative, costly 
regulations.93  Congress later followed suit with the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”).94  The 1984 Act 
codified the collective regulatory schemes of federal, state, and local 
governments.95  Most notable was the explicit bifurcation of 
regulatory power that “vested local authorities with extensive control 
over granting cable franchises.”96  Because the 1984 Act mandated 
that new competitors obtain a municipal cable franchise before 
entering the market, municipal officials stifled competition by 
offering exclusive licenses to the highest bidder.97  Additionally, the 
1984 Act prohibited local telephone companies, the likeliest cable 
competitors,98 from providing video service.99  Therefore, with this 
near impenetrable protection from competition and the elimination 
of local rate controls, Congress enabled cable operators to exploit 
their monopoly power.100 
 
Television, REASON, Feb. 1995, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/ 
hazlett/rahazlett72.htm. 
 89 Id.  See, e.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), 
aff’d, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding cable television to be a communications 
common carrier). 
 90 FCC Cable Television Rep. and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). 
 91 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 243 (citing Robert F. Copple, Cable Television and 
the Allocation of Regulatory Power: A Study of Government Demarcation and Roles, 44 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 1, 32 (1991)). 
 92 See Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation of Cable Television, Rep. and 
Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 855 (1975). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 
(1984) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C.). 
 95 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 244. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Hazlett, supra note 88.  Most municipal officials felt “as New York Mayor John 
Lindsay had when he remarked that cable franchises were like ‘urban oil wells 
beneath our city streets.’”  Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id.  The 1984 Act was “sponsored by then-Rep. Timothy Wirth [from 
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A short time later, Congress again reversed course and passed 
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992 (“1992 Act”).101  The 1992 Act, passed over President Bush’s 
veto,102 attempted to address some of the problems that remained 
after the 1984 Act.103  Congress remained watchful of the cable 
television industry and again altered the regulatory landscape with 
passage of the 1996 Act.  This legislation was designed, in part, to 
open “all telecommunications markets to competition.”104 
The 1984 Act freed systems from rate regulations when the FCC 
determined that they were subject to effective competition.105  One 
deregulatory component of the 1996 Act updated the term “effective 
competition” from its initial statutory use by Congress.106  The 1996 
Act added a provision stating that once a local telephone company, 
or similar service, offers video programming comparable to the cable 
operator’s service to that area, effective competition exists.107  When 
 
Colorado], often called the congressman from TCI.”  Id.  Tele-Communications Inc., 
the largest cable operator in the United States at that time, is headquartered in 
Denver.  Id. 
 101 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C.). 
 102 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 244. 
 103 Id.  The pertinent provisions of the 1992 Act included the prohibition of 
exclusive municipal franchises due to their adverse effects on consumers and the 
establishment of price ceilings on rates.  Id.  The 1992 Act also included a “must-
carry” provision that required “cable television systems to devote a portion of their 
channels to the transmission of local broadcast television stations.”  Id. at 245 n.66. 
 104 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 1 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11.  In 
regards to provisions in then existing legislation that prohibited telephone 
companies from providing video programming to subscribers in their service areas, 
the report noted three government agencies “the FCC, the Commerce Department’s 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the Department 
of Justice’s Antitrust Division” who “found that the statute impedes competition in 
the cable industry.”  See 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), repealed by 1996 Act, supra note 68, § 
302(b)(1). 
 105 Id. 
 106 See Brenner, supra note 8, at 404 (describing the initial use of “effective 
competition”). 
 107 The 1996 Act, supra note 68, finds effective competition to exist where a 
multichannel video programming distributor [hereinafter MVPD] meets one of four 
tests within its franchise area: 
(A) fewer than 30 percent of households  in the franchise area 
subscribe to the service of a cable system; (B) the franchise area is (i) 
served by at least two unaffiliated [MVPDs] each of which offers 
comparable video programming to at least 50 percent of the 
households in the franchise area; and (ii) the number of households 
subscribing to programming services offered by multichannel video 
programming services offered by [MVPDs] other than the largest 
[MVPD] exceeds 15 percent of the households in the franchise area; 
(C) a [MVPD] operated by the franchising authority for that franchise 
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the determination is made that effective competition exists, the 
municipality “may no longer regulate subscriber rates for the basic 
service tier.”108 
The 1996 Act’s overall goal of competition is partially met 
through the interplay allowed between cable television and telephone 
service providers.  Previously restricted by the AT&T break-up,109 local 
telephone carriers can now provide long-distance service and, 
correspondingly, long-distance providers can offer local telephone 
services.110  In addition, telephone companies can provide video 
programming and cable companies are allowed to provide local 
telephone service.111 Although attempting to introduce competition 
in the video marketplace by permitting telephone companies to 
compete with cable television providers, the 1996 Act does not 
prohibit municipal cable franchising,112 which remains the greatest 
impediment to competition.  Thus, the 1996 Act has only partially 
achieved the goal of true competition in the cable television market. 
Still, the 1996 Act does provide insight into the possible future of 
competition in the cable television industry.  Commentators have 
considered the phenomenon of overbuilding as a costly, yet possible, 
method to introduce competition into the cable television industry.113  
In allowing competition in local telephone service, the 1996 Act 
requires incumbent local telephone companies to work with any new 
 
area offers video programming to at least 50 percent of the households 
in that franchise area; or (D) a local exchange carrier or its affiliate (or 
any [MVPD] using the facilities of such carrier or its affiliate) offers 
video programming service directly to subscribers by any means (other 
than direct-to-home satellite service) in the franchise area of an 
unaffiliated cable operator which is providing cable service in that 
franchise area, but only if the video programming services so offered in 
that area are comparable to the video programming services provided 
by the unaffiliated cable operator in that area. 
47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(A-D) (1996). 
 108 Gregory W. Stepanicich, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Responding to a New 
Regulatory Maze,  at http://www.rwglaw.com/Articles (last visited Oct. 3, 2002).  Non-
basic service tier regulation was set to expire on its own.  Id.  The term “service tier” 
means a cable service for which the operator charges a separate rate.  47 U.S.C. § 
522(17) (1996). 
 109 See supra note 67 (explaining the divestiture of the AT&T Bell operating 
companies). 
 110 See Jones, supra note 14. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Stepanicich, supra note 108.  While cities may continue to franchise and 
regulate cable services, they are prohibited from extending franchises to other 
telecommunication services.  Id. 
 113 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 8, at 404.  Overbuilding involves “constructing a 
competing cable system over a territory already served by or franchised to another.”  
Id. 
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local telephone companies to “provide interconnection, number 
portability, dialing parity, and access to rights-of-way.”114  Similar 
cooperation between cable television competitors could serve to 
eliminate some of the costs of overbuilding a cable system. 
In regards to rights-of-way, the 1996 Act states that no 
municipality may prohibit any entity from providing interstate or 
intrastate telecommunications service.115  Municipalities do retain a 
“safe harbor” provision116 that allows them “to manage the public 
rights-of-way and to require fair and reasonable compensation from 
telecommunication providers on a competitively neutral and 
nondiscriminatory basis.”117  As a result of this provision, a statutory 
right grants competing cable providers the ability to purchase the use 
of public rights-of-way from the municipalities for use in their 
distribution systems.  Exclusive franchise grants, however, frustrate 
the ability of a competing cable system to enter the market in the first 
place. 
The variations in Congress’s regulatory approach to cable 
television display its uncertainty about cable television’s true 
classification and the potential fallacy in designating the cable 
television industry as a natural monopoly.  Consequently, the 
monopoly status of cable results more from governmental action, 
such as municipal franchising, than from economic factors.118  This 
conclusion warrants examination of the economic and political 
effects of the removal of the cable industry regulations to allow 
competition in the video marketplace. 
III. DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF CABLE TELEVISION AS A NATURAL 
MONOPOLY AND THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FRANCHISING PROCESS 
Generally, natural monopoly119 conditions result in government 
regulation of an industry.120  The supposition that cable television was 
 
 114 Jones, supra note 14. 
 115 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1996). 
 116 § 253(c).  One commentator noted that “an important addition to the 1996 
Act . . . preserved the power of local agencies to manage the use of their public 
rights-of-way.”  Stepanicich, supra note 108. 
 117 § 253(c). 
 118 Quincy Cable T.V., Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 119 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 260-61.  Natural monopolies occur in markets 
“with inherent structural characteristics that make it more efficient for one operator 
to offer services in the absence of competition.”  Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, 
Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969)). 
 120 Id. at 261. 
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a natural monopoly materialized legislatively in municipalities121 
awarding exclusive122 franchises.123  This process was a financial boon 
for municipalities as the franchising process included rewards by way 
of franchise fees and other services.124  Blinded by those rewards, 
municipalities ignored typical market considerations, specifically 
competitive pricing, during the franchising process.125 
Case law exposes the judicial view of exclusive franchise grants as 
the inescapable outcome of a competitive market.126  In this view, 
exclusive franchise grants that eliminate competition serve to avoid 
the “wasteful duplication of facilities.”127  This “wasteful duplication of 
facilities” is a product of the public ownership of the public rights-of-
way128 that provide the distribution system that operators compete to 
access.129  One commentator’s alternative solution permits private 
ownership of the distribution system running below each individual’s 
property so that he could connect to whichever provider he 
preferred.130  This scenario precludes the need for competing 
providers to incur unnecessary costs in entering the market and 
defeats the possibility of the duplication of facilities. 
 
 121 Id. at 246.  The FCC concluded that “local governments are inescapably 
involved in the [franchising] process because cable makes use of streets and ways and 
because local authorities are able to bring a special expertness to such matters, for 
example, as how best to parcel large urban areas into cable districts.” Id. (quoting 
FCC Cable Television Rep. and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207 (1972)). 
 122 Brenner, supra note 8, at 371.  While franchises have been denominated 
“nonexclusive,” cable franchises developed a monopoly status that “was accepted by 
federal and local authorities, by the participants in the franchise process, by the 
victorious cable operator, and by the public.”  Id. 
 123 47 U.S.C. § 522(9) (1996) (defining the term “franchise” as “an initial 
authorization, or renewal thereof . . . issued by a franchising authority, whether such 
authorization is designated as a franchise, permit, license, resolution, contract, 
certificate, agreement, or otherwise, which authorizes the construction or operation 
of a cable system”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 522(10) (defining the term “franchising 
authority” as  “any governmental entity empowered by Federal, State, or local law to 
grant a franchise”). 
 124 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 247.  “The local franchise boards recognized their 
ability to extort exorbitant services and favors in the process of granting a cable 
franchise.”  Id. 
 125 Brenner, supra note 8, at 370. 
 126 See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 
(7th Cir. 1982) (stating that “[a]n alternative procedure [to the competitive free-for-
all] is to pick the most efficient competitor at the outset, give him a monopoly, and 
extract from him in exchange a commitment to provide reasonable service at 
reasonable rates”). 
 127 Id. 
 128 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1996). 
 129 Brenner, supra note 8, at 395. 
 130 DEMSETZ, supra note 59, at 81.  This alternative allows the company owning the 
facility to sell it to the new provider.  Id. 
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The public rights-of-way justification for franchising is also 
flawed with respect to the degree that the government’s property 
interest is implicated.131  Cable operators use public property by either 
digging a trench to lay the cable or sharing a utility or telephone 
easement.132  The latter typically results in payment on the part of the 
cable operator to the public utility for the permission to occupy part 
of the easement that the government has already issued.133  The 
former appears to implicate a government property interest only to 
the extent of the cost “borne by the municipality associated with such 
use.”134  The 1996 Act supports such a pricing rationale,135 whose “pay-
per-use” scheme weakens the justification for the extensive 
governmental control present in the franchising process.136 
Despite the apparent contradiction of the de jure classification of 
cable television operators as a natural monopoly, the operators 
maintain their de facto monopoly status that began early in cable’s 
inception.  A large factor in the monopoly status of cable television 
operators is that no viable technology provided true competition to 
the array of services available through cable during the 1970s and 
early 1980s.137  The further development of competing technologies 
and services over the next two decades, however, created viable 
alternatives that weakened cable’s de facto monopoly status.  Thus, 
after the 1996 Act permitted telephone companies to enter the video 
marketplace,138 telephone companies and the improvement of DBS 
systems posed a significant threat to the monopoly status of cable 
television.139 
 
 131 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 252. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 252-53. 
 135 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (1996). 
 136 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 252-53.  “[T]he right to impose a charge for the 
use of rights-of-way [does not] provide[] justification for regulatory authority over all 
other aspects of cable television.”  Id. 
 137 Brenner, supra note 8, at 400-01.  The variety of available technologies 
included satellite master antenna television (SMATV), multipoint distribution service 
(MDS) and DBS.  Id.  SMATV was an alternative to cable, but was not in direct 
competition with cable.  Id.  SMATV was most often found in apartment buildings 
where the building owner had a choice between SMATV or cable, but the subscriber 
could not make that choice.  Id.  MDS was not a true competitor to cable because it 
only offered one channel initially, although it was later modified to have four-
channel groups in each market.  Id.  DBS was not viewed as a viable alternative to 
cable due to the ten to twenty-foot satellite dishes required for reception.  Id.  It was 
not until the 1990s that smaller, more easily mountable dishes were introduced.  Id. 
 138 See supra Part II (discussing the effect of the latest wave of deregulation). 
 139 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 269. 
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Telephone companies were uniquely positioned to compete with 
cable companies.140  They appeared able to provide services at rates 
lower than were possible through overbuilding141 and able to recover 
the costs of entry.142  Those incumbent local exchange carriers, 
however, have exited the video business.143  Electric and gas utilities 
are potential competitors to cable television, primarily due to already 
possessing “access to public rights of way, existing 
telecommunications facilities, and existing relationships with 
customers.”144  Despite these advantages, their entrance into the 
marketplace has been slow and is not expected to be widespread.145  
The reluctance of telephone companies and public utilities to enter 
the cable television market146 allowed the emergence of DBS as the 
primary competition facing cable television operators. 
DBS technology has a distinct advantage in competing with 
cable.  Although their systems do incur fixed costs of entry, primarily 
from the need to place a satellite in orbit to distribute their signal to 
subscribers,147 they can spread the cost of entry over a greater 
distribution area.148  The new wave of DBS systems began in 1994 with 
 
 140 Id.  The theory of telephone companies competing with cable providers “rests 
upon the assumption that a telephone company already has the infrastructure in 
place to provide cable programming to subscribers.”  Id.  “Without needing to invest 
in the fixed costs required by cable, the telephone company could garner a distinct 
advantage over the cable competitor.”  Id. 
 141 See supra note 113 (explaining the concept of overbuilding). 
 142 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 269. 
 143 In re Ann. Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery 
of Video Programming, Seventh Ann. Rep., 16 F.C.C.R. 6005, 6009 (2001) 
[hereinafter FCC Seventh Ann. Rep.].  Most chose to sell their MVPD systems and 
preferred instead to market DBS systems.  Id.  BellSouth, however, still operates some 
overbuild cable systems.  In re Matter of Ann. Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video Programming, Ninth Ann. Rep., 
17 F.C.C.R. 26901, 26905 (2002) [hereinafter FCC Ninth Ann. Rep.]. 
 144 FCC Ninth Ann. Rep., 17 F.C.C.R. at 26947. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 26904.  The four largest incumbent local exchange carriers have largely 
exited the video business.  Id.  A few smaller local exchange carriers continue to 
offer, or are preparing to offer, MVPD service over existing telephone lines.  Id.  
“[U]tilities are not yet widespread competitors in the telecommunications or cable  
markets.  Mainly, it appears that utilities will provide MVPD competition in scattered 
localities.”  Id. at 26947. 
 147 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 269.  DBS systems are able to recoup their fixed 
costs of entry due to the large number of potential subscribers resulting from an 
orbiting satellite.  Id. at 270.  Additionally, the satellite has other potential uses 
outside of television programming.  Id. 
 148 Id.  DBS operators can provide “coverage to a greater number of possible 
subscribers than an equivalent cable investment from an overbuild cable operator 
would provide.”  Id. 
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the launch of two competing providers, Direct Satellite Service and 
Primestar.149  Initial subscribership to those DBS systems150 left the 
industry with high hopes for the future.151  Early hurdles prevented a 
quicker start to DBS truly competing with cable,152 but they were 
overcome through legislative help that broadened the available 
service granted to providers153 and through technological 
improvements that lowered the cost for consumers.154  DBS thus 
obtained a foothold allowing it to exceed even the most optimistic 
expectations for market growth at its onset.155 
A monopoly, in general, exists when there is only one seller of 
services with no close substitutes.156  That single seller possesses the 
ability to affect market prices through its actions by way of its 
monopoly power.157  With DBS service at the forefront, in addition to 
telephone and utility companies possibly competing for subscribers, 
alternative providers are moving into position to offer video services 
at competitive prices.158  This trend affects the cable company’s 
 
 149 THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE 
TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 195 (1997). 
 150 Id. at 196.  In its first year of operation, beginning July 1994, DirecTV achieved 
subscribership of 600,000 households, about half of which were homes passed by 
cable systems.  Christopher Stern, DBS and Cable Square Off at the FCC, BROAD. & 
CABLE, July 10, 1995, at 42.  The FCC defines “homes passed” as “the total number of 
households capable of receiving cable television service.”  FCC Ninth Ann. Rep., 17 
F.C.C.R. at 26909 n.11. 
 151 HAZLETT & SPITZER, supra note 149, at 196.  Industry forecasters predicted that 
DBS along with cable’s other competitors, wireless cable and telephone company 
overbuilders, would reach “nearly one-third of cable’s projected total” of subscribers 
by the year 2000.  Id. 
 152 In re Ann. Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery 
of Video Programming, Fifth Ann. Rep., Separate Statement of Comm’r Susan Ness, 
13 F.C.C.R. 24284, 24483.  Potential DBS subscribers through 1997 declined to sign 
up due to “high installation costs, significant costs to hook up additional TV sets, and 
the lack of broadcast television service.”  Id. 
 153 Id.  After 1997, the cost of installation plummeted, yet it remained expensive to 
add service to additional TV sets.  Id. 
 154 FCC Ninth Ann. Rep., 17 F.C.C.R. at 26904.  The FCC attributes part of the 
growth of DBS “to the authority granted to DBS operators to distribute local 
broadcast television stations in their local markets by the Satellite Home Viewer 
Improvement Act of 1999.”  Id. 
 155 Id.  As of December 2002, DBS subscribers represented 20.3 percent of all 
MVPDs.  Id.  Between June 2001 and June 2002, DBS subscribers grew at a rate 
significantly greater than the cable subscriber growth rate, “from almost 16 million 
households to about 18 million households.”  Id. 
 156 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 260. 
 157 LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 344. 
 158 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 266.  The entrance of multiple cable providers, 
whether in a natural monopoly or a competitive system, results in heated 
competition to attract subscribers.  Id.  Such competition focuses the resources of the 
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monopoly power and challenges its status as a protected monopoly. 
IV. THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF CABLE TELEVISION’S MONOPOLY STATUS 
MANIFESTED IN HIGHER RATES, POORER SERVICE, AND SUBJUGATION 
OF CONSUMER CHOICE 
The most insidious effects of monopoly conditions are lower 
production159 and higher costs160 as compared to competitive 
conditions.  In the cable franchising scheme, lower production 
manifests itself through a “misallocation of resources result[ing] in 
diminished satisfaction of society’s wants.”161  The higher costs can be 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary.162  While pecuniary costs associated 
with running a business occur under any economic condition, the 
consequences of cable franchising and monopoly conditions are 
higher costs or poorer service.163  This system is unjustified because 
the costs passed on to consumers from the cable companies 
constitute an essentially needless wealth transfer from consumers to 
their municipality.164 
Despite the costs associated with obtaining an exclusive 
municipal franchise, cable operators are willing participants in the 
municipal franchising process.  The monopoly status created by an 
exclusive franchise permits cable operators to recoup their costs from 
consumers by charging higher rates165 for their services.166  Without 
competition, consumers are forced to pay higher rates if they wish to 
have cable television service, as they cannot elect to obtain service 
 
competitors on providing the most attractive services and fees to the consumers.  Id. 
 159 Id. at 281. 
 160 LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 344.  Through its monopoly power, a monopolist 
can “affect the market price of its output.”  Id. 
 161 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 282 (quoting Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as 
the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 
HASTINGS L.J. 67, 72-73 (1982)). 
 162 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 281.  “Municipal governments impose fees 
upon . . . cable operators that would not be required in an efficient market.”  Id.  
These costs serve to create monopolies and prevent competition from offering their 
services.  Id. 
 163 Id. at 282.  Consumers bear these costs through increases in the subscription 
rate or a reduced package of services available from the cable company.  Id. (citing 
THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, CABLE REGULATION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1995)). 
 164 Id. at 282. 
 165 Cable price estimates for 2003 predicted a rise by an average of 5.4 percent 
starting in January.  Grover & Lowry, supra note 22, at 40. 
 166 As per the 1996 Act, rate regulations for large cable companies expired in 
1999.  Stepanicich, supra note 108.  Cable rates have increased 45 percent since the 
1996 Act.  Holly M. Sanders, Echostar Has 2nd-Qtr Profit After Adding Customers, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 15, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bloomberg News file. 
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from another company without moving to a different municipality.167 
Customers bear non-pecuniary costs of cable monopolies in a 
variety of ways, including unpunctual responses to service calls168 and 
fewer programming options.  Programming options, which cable 
operators typically provide in several tiers,169 vary at the operator’s 
discretion.170  It would appear elementary that a large number of 
video channels results in a correspondingly large number of program 
sources to choose from.171  That reasoning is confounded by the dual 
function performed by a cable franchise holder.172  In the 
programming sense, complications arise in circumstances of cross-
ownership of programming channels and distribution services.173 
In Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. United States,174 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a 
constitutional challenge to two provisions of the 1992 Act.  At issue 
were the “subscriber limits provision” that authorizes the FCC to 
“limit the number of subscribers a cable operator may reach,”175 and 
the “channel occupancy provision” that “directs the [FCC] to limit 
the number of channels on a cable system that may be devoted to 
video programming in which the operator has a financial interest.”176 
In upholding the “subscriber limits provision,” the court echoed 
 
 167 See supra Part III (discussing exclusive municipal franchises). 
 168 Terrence Dopp, Cable Providers Lash Out at Lawmakers, THE EXPRESS-TIMES 
(Easton, PA), Oct. 17, 2002.  The New Jersey Legislature had proposed a plan under 
which one component “would require companies to respond to all service 
complaints within three hours.”  Id. 
 169 FCC Ninth Ann. Rep., 17 F.C.C.R. at 26909 n.12.  The FCC explained that in the 
tier structure 
[t]he primary level of cable television service is commonly referred to 
as “basic service” and must be taken by all subscribers.  The content of 
basic service varies widely among cable systems but, pursuant to the 
Communications Act, must include all local television signals and 
public, educational, and governmental access channels and, at the 
discretion of the cable operator, may include other video 
programming services.  One or more expanded tiers of services, . . . 
often known as expanded basic, also may be offered to subscribers.  
These expanded tiers of service usually include additional video 
programming channels. 
Id. 
 170 See id. 
 171 Eli M. Noam, Towards An Integrated Communications Market: Overcoming the Local 
Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 209, 210-11 (1982). 
 172 Id. at 211. 
 173 See Yankees, at 3.  For example, Cablevision is the majority owner and manager 
of MSG and FSNY.  Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D4. 
 174 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001). 
 175 Id. at 1315; see also 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (1996). 
 176 Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1315; see also § 533(f)(1)(B). 
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congressional concern about likely anticompetitive effects resulting 
from concentration in the media.177  The court deferred to the 
substantial evidence presented in the congressional report 
accompanying the 1992 Act stating that “increases in the 
concentration of cable operators threatened diversity and 
competition in the cable industry.”178  In upholding the “channel 
occupancy provision,” the court noted both the statutory aim of 
promoting diversity of available programming and the provision’s 
content-neutral applicability.179  In its analysis, the court focused on 
the incentive and ability of cable operators to favor their affiliated 
programmers, which imposes economic barriers to competition.180 
Before Time Warner, the United States Supreme Court had 
upheld the “must-carry” provision of the 1992 Act in Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.181  That provision required cable 
operators to carry local network signals on their systems.182  The Court 
upheld the provision against petitioner’s First Amendment claims,183 
concluding that it was narrowly tailored to render the burden 
imposed congruent to the benefits created.184  The Court quoted its 
earlier opinion in United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,185 stating that 
“increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression 
represents a ‘long-established regulatory goal in the field of television 
broadcasting.’”186 
The Court also identified “‘a governmental purpose of the 
highest order’ in ensuring public access to ‘a multiplicity of 
information sources, [a]nd [a] Government . . . interest in 
eliminating restraints on fair competition. . . .’”187  Those two goals 
should extend the justification of “must-carry” beyond merely 
requiring cable operators to carry local broadcast signals to also 
requiring the carrying of channels emanating from unrelated 
programmers.  Presently, such an extension of the holding does not 
 
 177 Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1316. 
 178 Id. at 1319-20. 
 179 Id. at 1321. 
 180 Id. at 1322. 
 181 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II]. 
 182 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 532-35 (1996). 
 183 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224-25. 
 184 Id. at 215-16. 
 185 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
 186 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 192-93 (quoting Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. at 667-68). 
 187 Id. at 190 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994) 
[hereinafter Turner I]). 
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exist.188  In reality, cable operators possess the ability to “silence the 
voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.”189 
The Court noted that in enacting the 1992 Act, Congress 
attempted to address concerns regarding the “increasing 
concentration of ownership and control in the cable industry.”190  The 
Court reasoned that the “must-carry” and “subscriber limits” 
provisions preclude cable operators from using their “bottleneck 
[monopoly] power to exclude other providers of cable 
programming.”191  Further, the Court noted Congress’s concern that 
cable operators might not let other programmers “say anything at all 
in the principal medium for reaching much of the public”192 and that 
the two provisions thereby serve to promote competition in the 
industry.193  Thus, the Court upheld Congress’s stated aims for the 
channel occupancy provision: increasing the number of voices 
available to cable viewers and placing reasonable limits on the 
number of channels an operator could occupy.194 
The aforementioned provisions of the 1992 Act attempted to 
resolve the problem caused by vertical integration in the cable 
industry.195  Vertical integration occurs when a company uses its 
monopoly power over one aspect of the production chain to stifle 
 
 188 Congress has opposed an FCC ruling that would have granted the largest 
television stations the ability to grow by owning more stations.  Stephen Labaton, 
F.C.C. Media Rule Blocked in House in a 400-to-21 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2003 at A1 
[hereinafter Labaton I].  The proposed FCC rule sought to expand the cap on a 
single company’s ownership of “television stations reaching 45 percent of the 
nation’s households, but the House measure would return the ownership cap to 35 
percent.”  Id.  Supporters of the legislation against the FCC rule asserted that 
“further media consolidation would reduce the diversity of voices on the airwaves.”  
Id. at C6.  The rule was similarly opposed in the Senate.  Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. 
Plan to Ease Curbs on Big Media Hits Senate Snag, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003 at A1. 
 189 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 197 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656). 
 190 Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1316 (referencing the Senate Report accompanying 
the final version of the 1992 Act, S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 32 (1991), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1165, stating “there are special concerns about concentration of the 
media in the hands of a few who may control the dissemination of information”). 
 191 Id. at 1317. 
 192 Id. at 1317-18 (citing Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656-57); see also Labaton I, supra note 
188, at C6. 
 193 Id. at 1318. 
 194 S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 25, 80 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1158, 1213. 
 195 Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1322.  Legislative history accompanying the 1992 Act 
“document[s] Congress’s concerns with affiliation between cable operators and cable 
programmers.”  Id. “The cable industry has become vertically integrated; cable 
operators and cable programmers often have common ownership.  As a result, cable 
operators have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated programmers.  This 
could make it more difficult for noncable-affiliated programmers to secure carriage 
on cable systems.”  Id. 
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competition in another aspect that ordinarily would have been 
competitive.196  The cable television industry can be viewed in three 
stages of production and distribution that includes manufacturers, 
wholesalers, and retailers.197  Vertical integration in the cable 
television industry could occur when networks (the wholesalers) own 
a large amount of broadcast stations (the retailers).198  The most 
direct solution to vertical integration separates the distribution role 
of a cable company from its programming function.199  Such a 
divestiture need not occur, however, if the company is simply 
mandated to allow access by other programmers. 
Addressing a different industry, the Supreme Court required an 
analogous access to competition in United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n 
of St. Louis200 when it dealt with the Terminal Railroad Association 
consortium in the late 1800s.201  Mindful of the waste that multiple 
railroad lines could cause, the Court required the consortium to 
provide access to its tracks and bridges to competing companies on 
“reasonable terms and regulations.”202 
The Court noted that joining two cities by more than one 
railroad line created an “unnecessary duplication of facilities.”203  As 
mentioned above, the courts used the same language to justify cable 
monopolies,204 yet cable rulings varied from Terminal R.R. because 
they lacked the mandatory provision of access to competing 
companies.  In the barest sense, the cable and railroad industries are 
similar with respect to the transportation of goods and services over 
their respective “lines.”  A ruling applying the Terminal R.R. “essential 
facilities doctrine”205 to cable companies could invite competition 
 
 196 Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 
19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 176 (2002). 
 197 Id. at 182. 
 198 Id. at 183-84. 
 199 Noam, supra note 171, at 216. 
 200 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
 201 Teague I. Donahey, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Using the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine to Ensure Accessibility to Internet Software Standards, 25 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. 
ASS’N Q.J. 277, 279 (1997).  “In 1889, a group of railroad companies . . . formed the 
Terminal Railroad Association . . . in order to consolidate the various railroad 
facilities and thoroughfares in St. Louis, including the central train station . . . and 
every connecting railroad system within the city and on either side of the river.”  Id. 
 202 Id. at 281 (quoting Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 411). 
 203 Id. at 286 (quoting Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 393). 
 204 See Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
 205 Donahey, supra note 201, at 307-08.  “The essential facilities doctrine . . . is 
generally understood to have its origins in Terminal Railroad.”  Id.  The doctrine 
mandates access to the essential facilities of a monopolist when that monopolist 
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while still allowing the incumbent company to remain.206 
The tale of cable industry regulation parallels the experience of 
regulation of the railroad industry.  After World War II, railroads 
faced competition primarily from the trucking industry.207  The 
trucking industry offered distinct advantages over the railroad 
industry,208 which left the railroad industry behind the technological 
curve.209  Unfortunately, railway regulation continued to persist for 
some time after these developments210 until Congress finally scaled 
the regulations back in 1980.211  Cable monopolies face a similar wave 
of competing technologies212 advancing upon their monopoly power 
and have had their share of deregulation.213  This deregulation is a 
beacon of hope for the future of competition in the video 
marketplace.  As the railroad example demonstrates, the regulatory 
mechanism might do more harm than good by producing more 
inefficiency than it eliminates.214 
 
possesses a “bottleneck” monopoly.  Id.; see also MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
 206 Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 411.  The Court preserved “to the public [the] 
system of great public advantage.”  Id. 
 207 Donahey, supra note 201, at 303 (citing THEODORE E. KEELER, RAILROADS, 
FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 28 (1983)). The trucking industry was also regulated, 
but deregulation began in 1980.  Id. at 304.  In the first six years of deregulation, the 
number of carriers doubled and prices fell between 28 and 56 percent.  See Robert 
Crandall & Jerry Ellig, Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric 
Industry, The Center for Market Processes, George Mason University, at 
http://www.mercatus.org/research/dereg_summary.html (March 12, 2003). 
 208 Id.  Notable advantages were increased efficiencies and lower costs.  Id. 
 209 Donahey, supra note 201, at 304. 
 210 Lawrence W. Reed, Deregulation: Coming to a Utility Near You, THE FREEMAN, Vol. 
47, No. 8, Aug. 1997, available at http://www.libertyhaven.com.  Railroad regulation 
“stifled competition, boosted costs, reduced management flexibility, and left 
railroads unable to compete effectively with alternative . . . modes of transportation.”  
Id.  The delay in railroad deregulation is attributed to the cumbersome regulatory 
scheme and the railroad industry’s support for the regulation that ensured their 
profit margins, despite prevailing questions of service quality.  Donahey, supra note 
201, at 304-05.  See GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965); 
Bruce B. Wilson, Railroads, Airlines, and the Antitrust Laws in the Post-Regulatory World: 
Common Concerns and Shared Lessons, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 711-16 (1991). 
 211 Donahey, supra note 201, at 304.  See Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45 and 49 U.S.C.).  
Since deregulation, “prices have declined 44 percent [and] delivery time has 
improved dramatically.”  Reed, supra note 210. 
 212 See Donahey, supra note 201, at 304 n.102; see also supra Part III (discussing the 
competing technologies). 
 213 See supra Part II (discussing statutory deregulation of the cable television 
industry). 
 214 Donahey, supra note 201, at 305. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Competition is the method best suited to drive down prices, to 
increase quality of service, and to offer options to consumers.215  The 
long overdue deregulation of the telecommunications sector injected 
competitive effects that have impacted the cable television industry.  
Cable companies, however, continue to possess exclusive municipal 
franchises that prevent customers from selecting among alternate 
providers.  The absurdity of this problem is evident when customers 
living across the street from each other are afforded different 
opportunities by virtue of living in separate municipalities. 
Fortunately for disheartened consumers, choices have recently 
begun to emerge.  Through technological advances, DBS companies 
have positioned themselves as cable’s biggest competitor.  While DBS 
subscribership has yet to rise to a level necessary to consider it a true 
competitor to cable, that level may soon be reached.  DBS has 
siphoned off nearly one million cable customers in 2002,216 and the 
industry is expected to continue to grow in 2003.217  DBS has thus 
been able to enter the marketplace despite the cable companies’ 
present monopoly position.  The loss of cable company subscribers to 
DBS providers218 indicates the tenuous justification for cable 
monopolies.  The dispute between YES and Cablevision displays how 
cable companies continue to fight to maintain their position, to the 
detriment of consumers. 
Without the intervention of the New Jersey Legislature, New 
York City Mayor Bloomberg,219 and New York State Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer,220 Cablevision customers seeking to view Yankees and 
Nets telecasts would still be in a difficult position.  Although the 
settlement ended the stalemate, it merely created a temporary 
solution specific to this local dispute and provided no permanent 
solution for the industry.  In a competitive market, customers could 
simply cancel their Cablevision subscription and select another video 
provider.  Exclusive municipal franchises, however, preclude the 
selection of another cable provider.  Even worse, the alternative 
 
 215 Wakeford, supra note 80, at 285.  Commentators contend that “under the 
contestable market theory, . . . cable operators will provide the same rates and 
services as if they were faced with direct competition.”  Id. 
 216 Grover & Lowry, supra note 22, at 40. 
 217 Ronald Grover & Tom Lowry, Media: Return of the Dealmakers, BUS. WK., Jan. 13, 
2003, at 126. 
 218 Id.  The forecasts for 2003 had DBS increasing their subscribership by 3 million 
customers at cable companies’ expense.  Id. 
 219 Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D1. 
 220 Sandomir II, supra note 15, at S2. 
  
772 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:747 
presented by DBS, to forego any cable service whatsoever, may not 
appeal to all consumers221 or the consumers may not yet benefit from 
these advantages.222 
Deregulation, despite its advantages, is not a complete solution 
to the problems created by regulation.  The telephone industry 
experienced per-minute rate decreases following deregulation, but 
that reduction was a result of regulated cuts in telephone access 
charges.223  Cable television subscription rates have skyrocketed under 
deregulation.224  In a rare positive aspect, regulation provided an 
additional benefit to consumers in helping to foster the Internet.225  
Nonetheless, cable television regulation imposes many burdens, and 
an overhaul of the regulation can better serve the community’s 
interests.226 
By no means are cable companies the villains in the present 
situation.  They simply had the benefit of monopoly status in the past 
and are now faced with a changing industry.  The concept of 
competition in the video marketplace requires consumer choice and 
infers that incumbent cable companies remain an important player 
in the video programming marketplace.227  Competition will force the 
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incumbents to adapt to a new marketplace because rate increases and 
poor service quality are not feasible business decisions when a 
competitor can attract customers by offering more favorable service 
options.  Competition has changed the landscape of the market, but 
“[t]he job is not yet done.”228  As competition continues to embed 
itself in the industry, the future for the video marketplace looks 
bright for customers and providers alike.  Officially breaking the 
monopolistic stranglehold that cable companies enjoy over 
consumers by eliminating exclusive cable franchises would 
significantly brighten that picture. 
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